If you look at the problem from the client's point view, it is very difficult to identify the client with a single paradigm. Consequently, we spent a lot of time trying to understand their true needs. We will outline how it was difficult to associate all the clients with the standard "life cycle model", in which the employees keep contributing to have enough money to maintain their standard of living until death. We have a second model in which there is a true interest from the employee in contributing in order to build a final endowment to leave future generations. So a second model that we can identify is the "legacy model". There is a third model, the true entrepreneur, whose interests and risk aversion do not follow the usual path, but instead follow a path in which the risk aversion does not decrease with age and who retains an appetite for risky assets during the later stages of life.
So we have very complex needs. We try to answer with a complex model, that allows us to solve what we call the pensions plan dilemma. On one hand we keep trying to optimise long-term returns, and on the other side, minimise the downside risk over an intermediary horizon. Being able to cope with multiple schemes, in terms of contribution, is a necessity because we have some clients who may wish to make their contributions at the beginning through a lump sum investment, others, who wish to make regular contributions and each of these will have different risk aversion and different target for expected returns and minimum guaranteed returns.
These are the ingredients that we need to consider when offering complete customised products. Such solutions will give the opportunity to some further soft aspects, such as human capital. A young employee of 25 years of age is easily identifiable as a longterm investor. If we take into account factors like human capital, such as job security and the risk of being fired, it is clear that this potential future pensioner has different characteristics and may have some intermediary horizons, say over five years or six years, during which he wants to secure a minimum return at a certain level of probability in order to cope with such adverse events. Professor M. A. H. Dempster, Hon.F.I.A. (introducing the paper): I suppose that as leading the quantitative attack on the development of the system of this paper, I should advise that the paper is really a case study to investigate two aspects of general problems in asset management or asset liability management: uncertainty --stochastics --and even more importantly dynamics. In other types of dynamic financial modelling these two aspects appear. For example, in the banking industry at this time there is a great deal of interest in dynamic capital allocation against the risks of various business units. Again, the technology of this paper can be employed.
So, how does this technology differ from ones that actuaries are more familiar with? If actuaries try to optimise asset management over a fixed horizon, with or without liabilities, one typically use some kind of fairly static model, usually after generating --perhaps very complex generation --dynamic scenarios of capital market variables, of economic variables, demographic variables, and so on. Then they use some kind of discounting, deterministic or stochastic, to produce present values and finally employ static optimisation using essentially Markowitz technology. It might be surplus that is optimised in an insurance application, but it is still static.
Something I want to emphasise --and the paper gives a great many details about this case, but this is the basic point --is that it is better to use dynamic models. Nobody says that they are simple; but 30 years ago Markowitz models were not simple either, and now everyone uses Markowitz models. Since then computers have advanced. Mathematics have advanced. Statistics have advanced. Stimulation has advanced. I would argue that it is now time to employ these models because they offer very significant advantages.
Another way of looking at this is that in leading applications in the actuarial and financial worlds people currently make very complex simulations, which in the actuarial world, usually go by the name dynamic financial analysis. I referred to scenario generation earlier. These simulations, however, employ very complex models and have many parameters. They are extremely difficult to fit to the data available and it is extremely difficult to optimise their decision parameters price fit, because the typical method is simply to take a few parameters, step them through various values and then try to analyse the output, which is quite bewildering.
So, from that point view we have coined the term strategic dynamic financial analysis, meaning that we will add industrial strength optimisation to this recipe.
To deal with a system like this is extremely complex. In figure 1.1 I want to stress the left-hand side of the diagram, which shows that one has to put a lot of different skills together. The computer science which deals with data, that is raw statistical analysis of data, cleaning it, filtering it, and so on. Next comes building the econometric models for both asset returns (as begun in this country and, indeed, generally by Professor Wilkie) and possibly complex liability models, although we are not going to stress these in this paper. Then, once we have these models fitted and tuned to data, we must use stochastic Monte Carlo stimulation, which is dynamic financial analysis and take us essentially down to the end of the third bar. Below that is what we want to add to the process; namely, the handling of essentially large-scale dynamic financial analyses models with parameters and optimisation of those parameters. They might be portfolio balances. They might be certain decisions such as capital allocations or more complicated business decisions. One needs complex software for this, and there is quite a bit about this of the problem in the paper.
To go to building the scenario generators, we have in fact (and there are details in the paper of the models used, and so on) a global system --hence the title of the paper --that deals with the four major currency areas and emerging markets. We do this in a way that has been pioneered by Professor Wilkie and others; to build a canonical model for a currency area and then link them together. We have linked the areas together with foreign exchange on the grounds that rates react faster than, for example, trade flows, which would come to mind initially for a macro economist.
What makes our dynamic financial analysis approach different from usual dynamic financial analysis. In dynamic financial analysis this is a typical case of scenario generation involving the New York Stock Exchange Valuated Weighted (refer figure 4.6) Index. What we do here is set up our econometric model, or use some stochastic differential equation model with parameters which we tune until we feel that the model fits the data represented by the black line. Then we generate scenarios forward out of sample. These are the coloured paths in the figure. We look initially to see if they have the kind of variants, and so on, variability, volatility as the black path, which is the history, and they have a suitable distribution around historical path, and so on. All a bit of art rather than science, however, broadly used these days.
On the other hand, we do not just do this for one variable. In our model using 15 variables and throwing in the economic variables, we can have a system of up to 33 state variables. So this is already fairly large-scale. However, the key point about stochastic optimisation is that it is not the optimisation problem necessarily that is now so difficult, because there are industrial strength optimisers which used cleverly can double running speed or even raise it two orders of magnitude using decomposition techniques. Rather it is that one has to generate high dimensional scenarios in a conditional mode (figure 4.7). This is just a scheme that represents the dynamic decisions every node this tree represents, for example, a portfolio balance. Every such decision must face alternative real-world scenarios. That is what makes it different. Even the scenario generation is thus more complex than basic dynamic financial analysis and requires extra software although in principle is straightforward.
The second type of problem we have solved, and generated software to address, concerns the formulation and solution of asset liability management problems, particularly those of defined contribution pension plans. These products are essentially mutual funds with a guarantee or a target return that is achieved at least with high probability. We use utility functions here not in the sense of individuals, but to represent the risk attitude of perhaps a sort of representative individual for a specific fund, tailored with respect to a specific horizon and specific risk characteristics, to which Mr Germano alluded to.
However, for scenario based models, such problems with a probabilistic constraint pose a new scientific class, which we believe we have solved in the applications that we have looked so far. There is still a lot to do. Rather than use a simplified theoretical model, say, with independent returns, period to period, and other restrictive assumptions, we have been able to solve these problems when the scenario generator is of the complex type, which I showed you.
The third type of problem that we looked at was the idea of setting up benchmark portfolios optimally. I have just come back from Princetown and our colleagues there have worked on a similar type of problem as an asset allocation strategy. Here what are trying to do, since these problems define a restriction of the full optimum, and impose a lower bound on it, is use this bound and the associated returns as a benchmark against which other strategies, including the full optimum, can be measured.
What happens for general cases of all three of these classes of models is that one obtains other suitable formulations really a very large-scale deterministic problem. Essentially, every node of the tree, that I showed you, has assigned to it a set of asset allocations or capital allocations, depending on the application (here it is asset allocations) that correspond to the states, that is the values of the state variables, at the time. That can be expanded so that we have, for every such node a decision, what is represented in the deterministic model are the constraints which are shown and enumerated in section 2.23. These are usually linear, because accounting is usually a linear operation. However, the attitude to risk, which is embodied for a particular fund and a particular horizon, can be represented by either a sum of risk attitudes represented period by period by a utility function or in fact just looking at risk in the terminal wealth achieved at the horizon.
What we are doing is designing tools to shape the wealth distribution at a particular point in time as the fund evolves (refer figure 6.1). We are interested in not failing to meet a guarantee, for example, by calculating value at risk through accounting scenarios which fail to meet the guarantee. We will use here tens of thousands of scenarios, possibly, and always we can trade off a kind of return variable with the risk variable to shape the wealth distribution. We have put a lot of work into understanding this trade off and in effecting it technically.
We have also done a lot of backtesting of the systems and are very pleased with the backtests. They are as honest as they can be and the returns have been quite good relative to the S&P 500, which we used as a benchmark because we treated this as a dollar fund. These results may not really mean anything due to the small size, as I am sure many people will point out, but it is very nice to have good results rather than bad results, even through the peak and the crash of the world's markets.
The last point is that the kind of systems described require pretty fancy graphics, because one has to go back and forth between tweaking data, tweaking models, optimising, and so on. We will never get away from that process. As the models get more complicated, we may have to do a little more. Figure D1 shows a sort of prototype screen which we are redesigning and implementing in practice.
To conclude, strategic asset liability management in tactical risk systems, which are dynamic, are a reality today. Multiperiod models yield multiple advantages. They tend to have a more stable portfolio path as we roll them forward because they hedge against a great deal of alternative scenarios, both good and bad. We can get best, worst and value at risk limited portfolio views, or asset and liability views, looking down the scenarios so that we can do a lot of 'what-if' analyses with these kinds of models. The assumptions, that are needed to make rolling over of myopic models correct, are almost entirely violated by real market data.
Using the type of software systems, which are used now in industrial optimisers, both linear and non-linear, we can model any kind of constraint structure, including regulatory and tax structures, and so on. The dynamic stochastic, strategic DFA, approach results in very large models, because they are contingency plans. All possibilities are being considered simultaneously, so they involve literally millions of equations and variables, but they can be solved in a few minutes on a current PC.
Flexibility and visualisation are keys to providing effective decision support systems of this type for strategic pension planning, and the other financial applications that I mentioned.
Dr A. J. G. Cairns, F.F.A. (opening the discussion): Dempster, Germano, Medova and Villaverde's paper is very interesting and comprehensive with many stimulating ideas contained within it, which the wider profession needs to be learning about.
The paper assumes a certain knowledge of the subject of dynamic optimisation. It may be helpful to cover some of the basic ideas in this subject area. A very simple example will illustrate some of the basic ideas, which will provide a firmer base from where we can look at the more complex environment that is in the paper.
In this simple example we have two assets: cash and equities. Investment is carried out over two periods. We have to decide what proportion of our fund, or what I will from now on call wealth, should be invested in equities over each of the two investment periods. So p 0 represents the proportion in equities from time 0 to time 1 and p 1 the proportion in equities from times 1 to 2.
Our investor has a utility function U which he will apply to his wealth at time 2. His objective is to maximise his expected utility by choosing p 0 and p 1 optimally.
One way of going about this is to find the optimal static investment strategy, that is, we assume that p 0 and p 1 are equal and then optimise over p 0 .
On the other hand, you have the opportunity at time 1 to revise your strategy in light of what has happened over the previous year.
What are the consequences of this? Well, first it makes sense to take advantage of this opportunity. If you do not, then you may be acting suboptimally, and you know you are acting potentially suboptimally by not taking this opportunity.
Second, how much you invest in equities at time 0 should take into account how you will act at time 1. This is the dynamic element. Now compare this with the static investment strategy. The second approach must be better in terms of optimising in advance the expected utility because the first, static approach is just a special case of the second.
What we can also point out at this stage is that p 1 does not need to be specified at time 0. Instead the optimal equity proportion can and should take account of what has happened in the first year. So it might be random, but we will have a rule, or a set of rules, which will allow us to determine p 1 at the time when we need it.
This simple problem leads us to the Bellman Principle, which tells us that any optimisation problem over T years can be broken down into a sequence of T one-year optimisation problems. Each one-year problem (or whatever time-step you want) is effectively a static utility maximisation problem which is clearly much easier to tackle.
As a side remark, in continuous rather than discrete time we use the HamiltonJacobi-Bellman equation (or HJB equation). There are growing numbers of papers on this in the international actuarial journals such as ASTIN Bulletin and Insurance: Mathematics and Economics. Typically these papers are more concerned with the development of qualitative results using simpler models, than we have before us today. However, the analytical nature of their results do allow us to quantify exactly how much popular, but suboptimal, strategies cost to the policyholder in terms of expected utility.
Coming back now to the discrete-time problem, in some cases, for example, power utility, the static optimal solution is the same as the dynamic optimum. In other cases, the static optimum delivers a far inferior optimal expected utility to an investor than the dynamic optimum. It is in this sort of case that we need to be able to identify and solve the dynamic problem as accurately as possible. 
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However, it is still not trivial, because we need to establish the optimal p* for each possible wealth at time t as I have tried to show in this first diagram.
As the number of state variables increases things get much more complex as we need to find the optimal asset mix for each combination of the state variables as we see in the second diagram In today's paper we find ourselves in the situation where (a) we want to carry out dynamic optimisation
we have a large number of state variables.
Indeed, to add to the complexity of the problem the authors include transaction costs. This, then, also increases the number of state variables.
For example, think back to my very simple example with two assets.
What the investor will choose to do at time 1 will depend not just on (a) total wealth at time 1 (as before), but also (b) how this wealth is distributed between cash and equity at the end of the first period of investment.
The reason is that the effective wealth available depends on how much trading you want to do at time 1 and what the transaction costs of this are.
So we have a complex optimisation problem, particularly in terms of computer programing and processing times. The paper brings to us a wealth of expertise built up over many years in the field of dynamic stochastic optimisation. The authors have brought together and summarised a number of technically difficult toolkits to address this problem.
The other important part to this paper is the authors' presentation of their asset model. This gives us the state variables for the dynamic optimisation problems. However, the model is very interesting to see in its own right given the relative scarcity of other wealth p * (w,r) (w,r)
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published models. It would have been nice to have typical parameter values for this model to allow us to get a feel for how it compares with other models.
Some specific observations now and questions, which the authors may wish to respond to during the meeting.
In ¶3.4.3 the authors describe a possible term-structure model and I have some thoughts and questions on this.
(1) What is the difference between R 0 and R?
They need to be different because of the use of the process Y and its dependence on a third dZ term.
(2) Both R 0 and L can go negative, so how do you deal with this in practical terms?
It appears that the real world version of these processes follows a random walk with drift through the constants δ. Could the authors comment on this, because my interpretation seems rather unsatisfactory and therefore probably incorrect.
(4) Finally how are we to interpret the α's, the market prices of risk? For example, how do they translate into risk premiums on various bonds?
In ¶3.1 the authors describe the different types of asset model: in particular, those developed in the econometric-modelling school and those developed in the arbitrage-free modelling school. To me the paper polarises things in a slightly misleading way. That is, a given model will belong to one school or the other with no middle ground. However, I can take my own model, cited in this section, as an example. This model was indeed developed starting from an arbitrage-free modelling standpoint. The approach implied in today's paper is to calibrate the model using today's market prices with a view to getting the best possible estimate of the market price of, say, some insurance or pensions liabilities. On the other hand, most of the arbitrage-free models can be calibrated using historical data. In particular, we can use exactly the same statistical methods of estimation as employed in fitting the econometric models. Thus there is no a priori reason why econometric models should be better than arbitrage-free models for long-term risk management purposes. Indeed, if a model is being used for dynamic optimisation, then it must be arbitrage free otherwise dynamic optimisation, properly implemented, will find the arbitrage to create infinite profit. It might well be that the authors feel that typical, arbitrage-free models are unnecessarily complex within the context of a global asset model, and this is true, but this is quite a different issue from the point that is brought out in that particular section.
At a couple of points in the paper the authors describe the use of a branching structure in the scenario generator. In particular, in ¶7.3.3 they use a 128x16x2x2 structure. I was quite intrigued by this. It is obvious that having two branches is quite inadequate for determining the optimal strategy in the final step, so the natural conclusion, perhaps, is that we should have, say, a 100x100x100x100 branching structure, or even bigger than that.
However, there is probably something much more clever going on here. The real aim is to determine the optimal strategy in the first step, where there are 128 branches, rather than in the final step of the tree. My question to the authors is this: does the chosen 128x16x2x2 structure give a reasonably accurate result? I am sure that there is, but in the time available to me for reading the paper I did not find the relevant references. However this looks like a very useful approach which is worth pursuing.
I was reminded here of an alternative approach to combining scenario paths with dynamic optimisation. Longstaff and Schwartz in 2001 looked at the pricing of American options -a problem which also requires dynamic optimisation. They proposed quite a different approach from the branching structure used in today's paper. What they did was to fit regression surfaces to the value function at each time step, working backwards from the terminal time. However, theirs was really a one-dimensional problem or a low dimensional problem, whereas today's paper deals with a multi-dimensional one. Perhaps the authors could comment on the relative merits of the two approaches.
For my final comments I come back to the main theme of the paper. The authors have described a global asset model with many assets. They then overlay a potentially complex dynamic optimisation problem and describe the various tools which exist to solve this type of problem. In the paper the authors note three types of error:
( 1) sampling error -the result of using a finite number of scenarios (2) parameter uncertainty -the result of having only a finite amount of historical data with which to estimate parameters (3) model risk -any model we propose can only be an approximation to reality.
Suppose we have been able to eliminate the sampling error. Parameter and model risk are still quite significant and this led me to wonder if there is an element of spurious accuracy in the methods being proposed by today's authors. In order to illustrate my point, we can take a much simpler example, the one-period Markowitz portfolio theory model. The output from this model is well-known to be very sensitive to parameter uncertainty. In particular, if we make even quite small changes to the mean returns on different assets, then the optimal portfolio mix can change quite markedly. In today's paper we have many assets and many time steps so it seems likely that the consequences of parameter error might be at least as big.
On the other hand, this does not invalidate the optimisation exercise. For example, we may find the results of an optimisation exercise which are not, in fact optimal. Indeed, the resulting investment strategy might be quite different from the true optimum. However, in terms of expected utility to the investor we will often be very close to the true, maximum utility: that is, if we had known the correct model and parameter set. So even though the asset mix is very far away from the optimal asset mix, the actual effects in terms of optimal utility are small.
So the existence of parameter and model risk should not be used as an excuse for not trying to optimise expected utility or some other objective. However, work needs to be done to establish when, in the presence of parameter and model risk, dynamic optimalisation delivers a result where the actual utility value is indeed close to the optimum. Mr A. D. Smith: A few years ago, I thought dynamic optimisation was a prohibitively difficult problem. I looked at investment on the basis that a strategic asset allocation would stay in place for several years. We talked about stochastic optimisation, but it was a lot of effort to get it working and the answers made no sense. For example, in my 1996 paper, which the authors quote, I got enormous potential trading profits from the Wilkie model, without taking much risk. In the discussion of that paper, Professor Wilkie pointed out you could not rely on a model behaving like that and I agreed with him.
Judging from today's paper, much progress has been made. The authors are right to be proud of the generic dynamic optimisation tools they have developed. On this occasion they show an application to a utility problem. Dynamic optimisation problems also come up in a corporate context: for example, the management of profit sharing insurance funds. The same optimisation tools might be useful for the problems that occur here, too, although the objective functions would be rather different. If we believe this paper, then there is a whole industry building optimisation tools, which actuaries should be able to tap into.
As it stands, the process seems demanding on input and parsimonious on output. For example, I would like to see some in-sample testing. How much reward does the model say is achievable for a given constraint on risk? How does this compare to the out-of-sample tests of what is actually achieved?
Out there in the market, there might (or might not) be some gold, that is, some exploitable opportunities to make investment profits with low risk. If you want to mine these gold nuggets, you need to make sure any model correctly captures them. But the process of fitting a model, can generate what I call 'fools' gold'. By this I mean trading opportunities that exist only in the model and not in the real world. Now we start mining, using dynamic optimisation. We think we find lots of gold nuggets -the question is: are they real gold or are they fools' gold?
Calibration by statistical time series analysis, which the authors advocate in ¶3.1.1, or even by eye, which they also seem to advocate, is notorious for producing fools' gold in simulation models. Parameter estimates might be unbiased individually, but the optimisation process serves to concentrate any sampling error. You can see this at work as follows. Simulate from your favourite efficient market model -so you know there is no real goldthen use one of your efficient simulations and apply the methodology in this paper to calibrate a second time series model. You will find that gold nuggets pop up all over the place in the second model, but you know they are not real because of the way you put the experiment together.
The paper is too dismissive, in ¶3.1.2, of economically based models. These more theoretically based models use asset pricing theory, which minimises the amount of fools' gold. See for example Chapter 16 of Cochrane's 2001 book for a clear explanation of how this works.
The backtests in Section 7, which we have seen amplified on the screen, claim a performance that is impressive without being extravagant. As the authors point out, in ¶7.3.6, their moderate success is probably due to the position limits they impose, and in particular the constraint of turnover to 15% of the portfolio. This is like telling a gold prospector he can only take 15% of any nugget he finds, irrespective of whether its real gold or fools' gold. The total volume of gold that the authors declare is perhaps within believable limits, but in the small print they are asking us to believe that there is another six times as much out there and up for grabs. At this point I believe that greater scepticism is in order.
In conclusion, we should congratulate the authors for their ambitious steps forward in stochastic optimisation. These techniques raise the hurdles for asset models. For the current paper, the asset model is surely the weakest link. But as the old adage goes, the best way to get rich in a gold rush is to sell shovels. Then you do not care whether the gold is real or not. And you cannot fail to be impressed with the shovels in this paper.
Mr C. A. Speed. F.F.A.:
The authors bring to the attention of the profession dynamic optimisation techniques, which have great potential for many areas of actuarial work.
In the pensions arena the work before us offers new possibilities for Defined Contribution (DC) schemes. The techniques in the paper could be applied to DC asset allocation strategies by setting investment strategies, which would take account of the utility of the member. We need to be cautious as there is much work still to be done in finding plausible utility functions and to be able to consider all aspects of the member's wealth and also personal liabilities. Then we have the problem of communicating that.
In the realm of Defined Benefit (DB) schemes, the paper has less to offer. The results make it clear that risk must be taken with investments when applying these methods. For any organisation there is clearly a limit on the amount of risk that can be assumed, particularly if that organisation might have need to raise further finance at a later date. So where should an organisation take risks?
There are two attractive possibilities.
(1) the company could invest in business projects in its current line of business. This should coincide with where the company has a competitive advantage.
(2) alternatively, the company could gear up its balance sheet and so use a tax advantage available for financing through debt instead of equity.
Both these approaches to risk-taking have clear advantages to the shareholders.
In contrast, taking risk in a pension scheme, for example, through equity investment, provides a shareholder with neither tax advantages nor the benefits of competitive advantage. As the amount of risk an organisation can take it has practical limits, equity investment or other risky strategies in DB schemes is clearly sub-optimal. The introduction of dynamic optimisation does not change this analysis.
It is a cause for concern that standard financial results we are aware of are not recovered within the current framework.
In ¶2.2.3 the authors talk about utility theory. Utility theory should be applied to individuals, as we are all aware. In this context the authors use it as applying to a fund. Using utility theory for a collection of individuals is fraught with difficulty. Essentially, we are using utility to measure the benefit to members. The utility function optimised seems to depend upon the fund, but in a defined benefit scheme there is also the implicit guarantee which is given by the sponsor and ultimately the shareholders. This does not seem to be allowed for. True we could update and optimise different functions but we are going to need to take this a step further. We know there is a guarantee, what value should a member put upon that or alternatively, what is the cost to shareholders of this guarantee?
We really ought to be able to value and to say something about that guarantee. The current paper does not, but this is possible, because we have arbitrage-free models, which, for example, include deflators. However these are precisely the models, which the authors reject in ¶ ¶3.1.2 and 3.1.3, so the key question relating to DB schemes cannot be answered in the current framework.
Again, this is another example of the problems of using econometric models rather than arbitrage-free models. Arbitrage-free models are harder for advisers. There are no magic solutions, which crop up and make everyone a winner, though they are a useful reality check.
In summary, the paper offers promise of dynamic stochastic optimisation. As a profession, I hope that we go away and learn from the important techniques presented. There is much work to be done still. We ought to be aware of unjustifiable simplifications or possible wrong terms, be it the use of the asset model or the representation of the economic interests of the different stakeholders. If we are not careful, these simplifications could lead to illusory gains rather than tangible results.
Mrs S. Bridgeland. F.I.A.: As Chairman of the Finance and Investment Board of the profession at the moment, I thank the authors for this paper.
With regard to the case study, it is useful to have a concrete example of a project in an area, which is of particular relevance to the profession. There are significant challenges in dealing with Defined Contribution arrangements as opposed to Defined Benefit arrangements, which this paper helps us consider.
There are four main challenges.
Firstly, the choice of the asset model when modelling for a single individual rather than a group of individuals merits special attention. In a group you expect there to be some sharing of risks over time, which permits some approximations. Previous speakers have mentioned the comments made in ¶3.1.2 about the different sorts of asset models that are available when modelling for an individual. I favour a scientific theoretically accurate model rather than, what Professor Dempster might have described as, a more artistic model that takes into account some of the real world risks. However, the profession should not be focusing too much debate on whether a model is particularly right or not, when the real issue for the profession is how wrong it could be.
Our responsibility is to ensure that we do not advise individual members of pension schemes in a way which might mislead them about the potential risks of a particular investment strategy.
Second, it is vital to have a better understanding of utility functions. I agree that using a dynamic approach to the asset allocation problem helps when modelling realistically. We know when advising Defined Benefit pension plan trustees that they have different utility functions when the market has just gone down by 20% compared to when it has just gone up. They have different demands for risks and return and a different way of thinking about scheme assets and potential rewards.
Much of the existing work on utility theory highlights the difficulties in actually desiring somebody's unique utility function, their real trade-off between risk and return. Whatever investment questions you ask someone, it is clear that when they come down to make investment decisions, reality kicks in and some other rules apply. For example, what they read in the paper last night about which way markets have gone may influence their attitude. We might be deluding ourselves, it might be another fools' gold to believe that we can actually tune into that aspect of human behaviour in a way that means that we can optimise the solution through a single model. I do not see any harm in selecting a tractable model for utility functions if that means that we can find an answer but we need to be sure that we understand how wrong that answer might be.
Thirdly, communication. There are some useful concepts in the paper, for example, the expected shortfall across scenarios in ¶5.6.2, and the severe downside linear penalty in ¶6.4.1, which may be difficult to explain to an individual member of a pension scheme. But there is potential to use these sorts of models to develop new ways of communicating risk, and the compromises involved in suboptimal activity and suboptimal investment strategies to members. For example, looking at the traditional lifestyle approaches that we might use at the moment, how suboptimal are those? How much better could we do?
That leads on to the final challenge which is to help design better investment products targeted more on the risk and return requirements of individuals. In ¶6.3.2 the relaxed fit/rebalancing rule model looks like a promising move for further investigation.
I hope that this paper will trigger off further research to enable us to help those that we advise understand the risks involved in saving for their future.
Mr M. Lamb (a visitor; Managing Director, Investment Banking, Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein): I am an investment banker. This paper provides a very important framework for understanding the trade-offs between risk and reward, not just for the actuarial profession, but also for others working with it as well. It laid down a number of principles for optimising wealth, not just for institutions but also for the individual market as well.
The debate raises two worries. Firstly about communication, for the non-actuary and maybe for the actuary. As Ms Bridgeland mentioned, there was a communication issue or challenge, not just communicating this type of analysis to the profession, but also to the institution and to the people, who will need to rely on this type of analysis. There is a far greater challenge probably for the institutions, the providers operating in the life and pensions industry, to communicate the benefits of this type of analysis to individuals, who are entrusting their pension assets to the industry.
When there is fragile confidence in the industry, there is an issue about how the results are interpreted as well. One of the benefits of this type of analysis is that it does identify risks. What is important is that those risks are interpreted as well and that judgements are made around that.
That brings me to my second point in terms of confidence. I think Mr Smith also made this point. It is very important that this is only a framework. It cannot replace judgement. Certainly, investment managers, actuaries and boards, will be using this as an important tool to make decisions, to make judgements, but it would not necessarily eliminate experience in terms of making those very important and what are often binary judgements.
In terms of the opportunities, this type of analysis enables us more accurately to quantify risk and analyse that form of risk, and there is an opportunity here for the investment banking community to tailor products to address those types of risks. But generally, if those risks are more precisely quantified in order to develop cheaper and more effective pricing for products to address risk, that should be beneficial for all people who place their assets in pension funds. We are taking the naive approach that history tells us something about the future. History tells us something about the relatively near future and not very much about the long future. If we are looking at long horizon problems, which we are, 20-30 years, then of course we need some kind of arbitrage-freeness.
However, this debate about the two classes of asset return models is more subtle because to generate the real world probabilities from a deflator model one has to tune it to something. The literature is a bit thin on this as much of it is in terms of, for example, state prices, Arrow-Debrem securities, and so on, which I find very hard to see or to buy in the marketplace, actually. Therefore this turning is quite difficult. I think that Mr Smith, Mr Speed, and Dr Cairns, would admit that it is equally difficult to calibrate these kinds of models as it is for generally specified econometric models, at least without using econometric techniques.
There is one criticism I should like to address immediately. Mr Smith made much about the fact that optimisers find the spurious things and then show you fools' gold, etc. This point is fairly easily addressed. One of our co-authors has been working on relatively simple schemes to make sure that those kinds of trivial arbitrages are not found and can be automatically eliminated as scenario trees are generated.
We were accused perhaps of being artistic, and that may be a compliment. We are also scientific in that we have taken a kind of schoolboy approach to spurious arbitrages which is to generate problems and see the outcomes. It was a surprise to me that suppressing the sampling error of the generated scenarios actually stabilises the decisions and, answers the question that Mr Smith raised: what happens in a sample?
Since the paper's topics were defined we have been spending our time studying the decision stability question. For example, Mrs Bridgeland referred to the probabilistic constraints and how these are related to individuals. It is critical that in the scenarios that are generated to optimise the probabilities of violating a guarantee or a value at risk number, either of which might be considered, must hold out-of-sample for flat scenarios generated exactly as the ones used in the model's scenario tree.
That turns out to be not as trivial as one might think, but with proper manipulation of parameters of the model one can ensure virtually the same probability of violation of a guarantee constraint within the model that has been optimised on, say, 10,000 scenarios as for 100,000 further flat scenarios that have been generated over the same time period from your scenario generator. That is a key result.
That leads me to a second misconception. Those of us who have been trained as economists, or in a latter day way, have come to financial economics, think of utility as applying to individuals. We have heard several comments along these lines. However, to go back to von Neumann and Morganstern a utility is simply a representation of preferences over probability distributions, and the probability distributions that count in the models of the paper are wealth distributions at particularly the horizon and possibly at time points before the horizon. As Mr Smith pointed out, as we roll forward we are only going to implement the first decision, the first portfolio balance, in the light of all the uncertainties. We want to handle the risk of the wealth distributions that come from the model. That is all we are attributing to utilities. You could call them objective functions, which we are using to shape distribution at the horizon or as we go along, which is more difficult, but it still can be done. There what we do is assign a utility function at each period. More recent experiments, than those in the paper, have been carried out by Michael Villaverde along those lines, although some of the early work is in the paper.
So I should like to dispel the notion that we are really exactly trying to get individuals. Mr Germano can clarify because he said in his opening remarks that we are dealing in fund design with a whole lot of different horizons. That is what is going to be needed to be provided to a bunch of individuals.
Another point, which was mentioned, is that we need to consider liabilities, as we go along. This is what the system was designed for, to deal with cash requirements or cash inflows as one goes over time and to see the possible nature of that over future scenarios, and their implications for today's balance for the fund.
Another point, made by Mr Lamb, was that no matter how complex the model, it does not replace human judgement. We used the term "decision support system" in the paper, and we meant exactly that. I tried to stress that with the graphics, which are a real technical challenge from a computer science point view, you want to be able to look at data that went into the statistical models, scenarios that are generated, and paths of the portfolios on the dynamic models to see what you would do in various scenarios that have been projected forward, and you would want to look at all that together and be able to flip back and forth between them. That is because the only way to get this right is to apply human judgement and knowledge. We are certainly not suggesting that this will be a turn on operation that just flicks out what you want.
Dr Cairns mentioned the yield curve model. We got the model from Lehman Brothers. It was one widely used for pricing fixed income derivatives in the past. It is a bit confusing, partly because we could not manipulate one symbol on the diagram; I hope we will solve this problem before the paper is published.
It is essentially a three factor model. There is a very short rate, which is a one month rate, a three month rate, which is there implicitly because it defines is a slope with a long-term rate, which in this case is a 30 year rate, the Bellweather bond rate. Dividing up the yield curve this way, we are aiming to back out the market prices of risk for the three factors, not so much because we wanted to interpret them carefully but, because we knew they changed over time, even fitting them to today's yield curve data, and we wanted to see whether the variation of these quantities over time really correlated well with our macro economic variables.
Mr M. Germano:
Starting from the last contribution, and the effort that has been put together in terms of communication, I will try to give more insight about wealth distribution and the study on the true distribution of the population in terms of true needs. We have also set up, in parallel with this working group, a research group for the past year. This will be a long-term partnership, in order to understand a bit more in-depth expectation of the client and how to interpret and to study the distribution of the population. So we are not trying to go down to the single individual future pensioner, but we are trying to classify them in a few classes and trying to answer with proper products. We are going close to a customisation of the products without going into the individual long-term plan.
This increases the number of inputs. The demand for new inputs is even higher, because we have a lot of work to do in order to understand what are the proper products to meet individual needs.
The true goal of the system is risk management, studying future scenarios in order is to limit the downside. The system is also used in order to develop stress scenarios, to verify where the current products already in the markets are really reliable and in which different scenarios would produce wealth distribution expected as they arise.
Another point about judgement, the system has been built in order to be used with judgement and it is not replace the decision-making of the portfolio manager, it is just giving the portfolio manager an extra tool in order to analyse extreme scenarios and have more insight about the possible near and long-term future.
In terms of communication, a big effort has to be made. The client does not need to have all the information about the technicalities. What is important is to give a clear understanding of possible future scenarios.
Professor M. A. H. Dempster, Hon.F.I.A.:
This paper is part of the effort of communication of this technology, which is being considered in the actuarial world, in the investment-banking world, and financial services generally. Just as in the early 1970s people began, 20 years after it was proposed, to look at the Markowitz model, people are beginning to look at stochastic optimisation models, 20 years after they were first studied. In the introduction to our paper we discussed the very restrictive assumptions under which myopic models are optimal. The inappropriateness of these assumptions and the advance of the technology generally is what is driving a lot of institutions, banks, actuarial consultants, and so on, to use some version of these kinds of models, and to try to optimise them.
Communication is a problem because they are complex. Regarding use for individuals, there have been several attempts round the world, by various financial services companies, to produce individual advice based on these kinds of models or approximations to them. These so far have been uniform failures. At least the banking industry is now backing off and seeing that so-called high net worth individuals are a more sensible market. There are several projects underway along those lines. These should come ultimately to individuals but not yet. Then utility, in the classical sense, will be usable. It is not, however, how we use it here.
Mr M. H. D. Kemp: I want to share one or two thoughts about asset liability modelling more generally.
When I have reviewed the results of asset liability modelling exercises, they gave the same relatively straightforward answer. The more you invest in equities, if you believe equities are going to deliver good returns in the long-term, then the better off generally you are, except in a relatively few circumstances, when you are worse off. This seems to be an almost universal result.
It seems, subject to a few sweeping generalisations, that with all such exercises you start off with a stance that is very low-risk indeed, and then you consider alternatives that move away from that stance in some shape or form. Whatever financial institution that an actuary might advise, the starting point is essentially to approach a very highly rated bank, or institution, and say: "Please sell me an instrument that will deliver exactly what my liabilities look like." In principle, let us assume that it is possible to do this. The next step is then to say: "This instrument costs 100, I have 120". Then there is a margin to play with. Conversely "I have only 80!" Then there is a need to find more funds. You always start with the low-risk position and then take a view as to whether and how to move away from that stance. "Arbitrage-free" or "not arbitrage-free" instruments and several of the tools covered in the paper can be used to produce possible outcomes.
Firstly, there is the problem of how to price a complicated derivative of the sort just highlighted that is to match exactly a specified liability. The methodology actually used in the marketplace seems to be very similar to the sorts of technique described in the paper. The techniques are widely used in derivatives houses for pricing complicated derivatives. Second, this approach also helps with the arbitrage-free vs not arbitrage-free question. A derivative house pricing such a derivative will work out some kind of low risk investment strategy or some other kind of dynamic hedging approach "to match" the liabilities. Therefore all the other aspects of the asset liability problem can be thought of as a divergence from the matched stance. If inefficiencies or arbitrages exist in an asset-liability model, then it is possible to work out where they are coming from by analysing the difference between the strategy the model claims is optimal when incorporating differential returns between asset classes and what it would have claimed as optimal if you had adopted a very high preference towards the lowest possible risk. In summary, there is a very strong link between some of the techniques described in this paper and some of the techniques already used by the investment-banking community, when pricing derivatives.
Mr P. J. Nowell: I have been using the techniques described in the paper for about 10 years or so now, that is asset-liability techniques, and mainly using them with with-profits funds. Therefore I should like to make a few observations. The main thrust of the paper is the concept of optimisation. In my work I find it difficult, despite trying different ploys and interrogating the data, to hone in on the things that would help lead to optimal solutions and funding methods to do that in some way would be helpful.
My interpretation of history would be that in the 1990s, when we were looking at these issues, we started off with a simple conundrum of maintaining solvency continuously, as we are supposed to do in a life company, and to optimise what the asset allocation should be in order effectively to maximise returns to policyholders and, by implication, if you are taking 10% of the profits for shareholders, then to optimise that as well.
We did a huge amount of trial and error. What we tried to do, in order to come to some sort of conclusion, was converge on solutions as opposed to just trying out something and then trying something else and spending hours not converging. But that process involved more sitting and thinking what to do next, and trying to eliminate silly things, rather than any scientific optimisation process.
Later we focused on not only the actual return and the total bonus, but also how much of it we could give by way of reversionary bonus. That put a new dynamic into it. We came up with different types of solutions, and a better understanding of the underlying dynamics of the model. We then examined or modelled the different types of shareholders' transfers, the difference between a fixed and a floating benchmark, and, generally, what was the optimal strategy. This work caused us to think in terms of not just the quantum but the shape of the distribution. We were also able to use the model to calculate the cost of the support loans when acquiring other life companies. We learnt a tremendous amount about the dynamics of the funds but never found a clear way of optimising strategies.
I agree with the authors about the importance of use of graphics as a communication tool. The more ways you can turn the results around and zero in on particular issues, the better. We collect a tremendous amount of data, that is not always analysed fully, but to be able to look at it when necessary is very valuable. For example, the recent work of the Continuous Mortality Investigation Bureau, analysing the cohort effect, which was there all the time but which we had never seen before. Use of graphics is an extremely good way of seeing with great clarity something that is very difficult.
Adopting the models set out in this paper will enable us to get away from trial and error and come up with optimal solutions. My concerns are about the difference between arbitrage-free models and ones that are not arbitrage-free, the question to the authors is: do these techniques work well with arbitrage-free models? In other words, do they actually help you in the zeroing in on the right solution process, or is the optimisation heavily influenced by the fools' gold type of approach, in which case that may help to guide you in the right direction only if the model is correct but in which case you then have to worry about whether you are looking at what the model is telling you rather than what the real-world does.
Professor D. Blake (a visitor; Professor of Financial Economics, Birkbeck College, University of London and Director of the Pensions Institute): When I entered my profession in the early nineteen seventies, the big thing was large-scale macroeconomic models. They started pretty small, beginning with a few equations, and then hundreds of equations and then thousands of equations. You could end up getting big government grants for building largescale macroeconomic models of the U.K., the U.S.A., Japan, and even the whole world. This was fine until you started to predict. There were many little variations and permutations on this model. One of the variations always gave very good predictions. The problem was that you never ever knew which one.
After a while, research money dried up. It became clear that these large-scale models were of little practical use. They had too much of a 'black box' feel about them. This is also my feeling about the techniques used in this paper despite their sophistication. Instead of large-scale models we reverted to simple models, going back to first principles. I later became interested in pensions. My simple approach to this was the life cycle model, in which you want to smooth consumption over your life cycle. You have fluctuating wealth, fluctuating income, and so forth, but want to smooth consumption over your life cycle. A pension plan is just a way of smoothing consumption over your life cycle. It is an investment vehicle for switching resources from when you are young to when you are old, that is an investment vehicle to hold stores of wealth while you are young to accumulate a fund or funds from which you can drawdown when you are retired.
The key issue is the simple design of investment products, not the complicated models that we now see in the paper; models exhibiting all these risks, sampling risk, modelling risk, and so on. You can never be sure how precise and useful the predictions are, as was the case with large-scale macro models. I would always go back to first principles.
The models in the paper only focus on the accumulation phase. It does not discuss what to do during the drawdown decumulation phase. Ideally, two types of assets are needed, zero-coupon wage indexed bonds during the accumulation phase, to hedge the earnings risk during the working career, and during the decumulation phase something I call "survivor bonds" (see reference below). Survivor bonds are annuity bonds where the coupons fall over time at the same rate as the cohort of the population drawing pension annuities dies out. For example, for every 100,000 people on the issue date of the bond, if, after a year, 98% of that group were still alive, then the coupon on the bonds would fall to 98% of the starting coupon. But the coupon payments would continue so long as cohort members were alive. Survivor bonds would enable life offices to hedge the mortality risks.
The interesting question, given all the arbitrage-free modelling in this paper, is why do the two types of assets not exist? Why do we need to look at emerging market funds and all the other asset categories discussed in the paper in order to find accumulation vehicles and decumulation vehicles for what is a very simple problem: transferring resources over time from when you are young to when you are old? The Pension Metrico approach to pension plans design is much simpler.
Mr A. D. Smith: I should like to come back on the question of utility. Utility is a way of ranking distributions. That is where von Neumann and Morganstern start (reference). The question is what do you apply the utility to? von Neumann and Morganstern appear to be trying to apply it to somebody's total wealth. But what if you have a model describing only part of somebody's wealth? For example, perhaps somebody is buying a house and stock market investments. Maybe they have some bonds overseas and maybe some legacies in the pipeline from rich relatives. Does it make sense to take just the equities that they are investing in and put them through some sort of utility or Markowitz model? No, it would be better to get hold of the whole of their wealth to use that sort of model.
In the case of some defined contribution pension funds, you might find that the vast majority of somebody's retirement savings were in those funds. In such cases that might be appropriate to use a utility approach. For the paper, the client is a corporation that operates these funds and provides guarantees to those funds. To try to advise that corporation on the basis of the utility function of the fund seems a bit nonsensical. For a start, the corporation does not receive any of the upside, because that goes to the members of the fund. They are interested only when there is an event, when they have to make up the guarantees. When you are dealing with a corporation, rather than considering the corporation to have a utility, why not consider the investors in that corporation and their utilities? Very few investors have only a single equity in their portfolios, one should probably suppose that those investors can diversify and have already done so.
That rather changes the problem. It means that you might want to look at options from an option pricing point view rather than from a utility maximisation point view. There is no justification for applying utilities to corporations. If you take the utility approach to its limits you find that no corporations should ever specialise. As well as running investment funds, the corporation should also start making automobiles, organise package deals to far-flung places, exploring for crude oil, and so on, because you are going to improve the utility function merely by diversification. Of course, that only makes sense if the person who invests in this particular institution cannot diversify on their own.
That is the point that both Mr Speed and I were seeking to make. From an individual investment point view, we can see that at least in principle it makes sense to say let us try to figure out what this individual's utility function is. From the point view of managing a corporation, whether it is an insurance company with a with-profits fund, or whether it is a company with a defined benefit pension scheme, it really does not make a lot of sense to take just the fund in isolation and to imagine that somehow it was going to serve the corporation or its shareholders by applying a utility function to what is a tiny proportion of somebody's total wealth. Mr J. P. Ryan: I should like to cover the issue which Mr Smith just raised, because I have recently been exposed to pension funds from a rather different angle, that is trying to find market solutions to some of the risks that one finds. The marketplace for a number of risks is very different from what the profession in general and the funds are investing. The reason for that is in many cases there is not the proper marketplace, people going down the utility function of the individual corporation. If you look at issues like longevity risk vis-à-vis the fund, you cannot simply diversify. There is not a market out there that actually does that. Capacity is exhausted.
You start getting into a capacity pricing type approach rather than a utility type approach, which means that you go then into some of the non-life type assets because you cannot diversify. That starts putting the risk loadings up on these things quite substantially. The parameter for operation type risks again comes very significantly into play and significantly increases the price over and above the outcomes of a lot of these optimisation type issues.
The other issue, which in terms of pension funds where utility theory does not come into play, is often a lot of this depends on the credit standing of the individual institution that is standing behind it, which for the pensioner or the employee means that he has his risk very heavily concentrated in that institution. Again, that needs to be reflected and priced, which seems to be allied to the issues that Mr Smith raised.
There are many interesting points in the paper in terms of techniques, but when it comes through to pricing some of these things, we need to follow some of these matters through further.
The President (Mr J. Goford, F.I.A.): One of the advantages of sitting here, and in no way this being my field, is that I can ask some naïve questions.
Those of you who have read my Presidential Address may or may not be aware that I advocated much more involvement of actuaries with financial economics, and indeed recommended that all actuaries should read certain chapters of Brealey and Myers. That was the book of the month for July.
The book of the month for November, which I am two-thirds of the way through, and hence the naïveté of the question, is "When Genius Failed", which is the story of Long Term Capital Management's demise. The second question is looking at what employees are now being confronted with in their defined contribution schemes. They are being given access at their workplace to information on their choice of investment advice or investment funds and being shown the different expanding funnels of doubt depending on what particular funds they have chosen from low-risk to high risk. Employees are encouraged to ask for information like "I do not want an expected return; I want a return that is 85% likely to happen." Would a fund manager with these sort of techniques enable a narrower funnel of doubt for a particular investment choice and therefore, for a given propensity for wanting an 85% probability of pension, enable a more risky underlying investment? I start by making a comment on the system, that we have in the actuarial profession, for organising sessional meetings, or strictly, Ordinary General Meetings, of the Institute. Years ago, the Institute used to have six sessional meetings a year. That included the Presidential Address every second year. Now we have about nine a year and that is too many. We do not have a queue of good papers waiting to be presented, as some other organisations do. Instead, we look around for papers, accept almost any volunteers and then put pressure on authors to meet a deadline. As a result, papers are often late; they receive very little scrutinising and certainly not proper academic refereeing. The quality and reputation of the British Actuarial Journal consequently suffers. I suggest that we have fewer formal sessional meetings and take up all the spaces with discussion sessions, as sometimes we do have, introduced by unrefereed notes, not necessarily all printed in the British Actuarial Journal, as this meeting will be, but making a distinction between the refereed papers and the unrefereed notes.
I, and colleagues, are producing a paper for the next Faculty sessional meeting in January, and we are running late. I am conceited enough to think it will be an important paper, and it would be a better paper if certain aspects of it could receive more investigation, than would be possible in the remaining few days left to finish it off.
The paper before us this evening has clearly suffered from this problem. It has not been available for long enough for most of us to study carefully, and the lack of time to consider it has been reflected in the rather few technical contributors that we have had in the discussion, although there have been plenty of practitioners making extremely useful points in general. The paper has been hastily printed, so one needs both the A5 photocopy and the PDF version to get all of it. It also suffers from a necessary defect, that is common to all academic papers, which is it relies heavily on references to other papers. This is normal and quite proper in the academic field, because academics usually have access to good libraries and ought to have time to look up other papers on their relevant subjects, as research is part of their job. But actuaries, apart from those who are also academics, usually do not have access to the same quality of library or the time to make themselves familiar with all the previous literature. Of course, it will be difficult for anybody to do so in the space of a few days.
Here I can say these things, because the paper this evening is a good one. Its subject is perhaps the most important one that actuaries face: the guidance over time of a financial institution. It is not referring specifically to a defined contribution pension fund. The principles apply to any financial institution.
Most of us drive cars and also navigate a car to where we wish to go. Guiding a ship or an aeroplane, navigating it to its destination, are also skills that many have. Sending space ships round the solar system is also possible for those who have the skill. However, guiding a financial institution to avoid disaster and with the best possible outcome seems to be a lot harder. Part of the reason for this is that spacecraft obey the laws of Newtonian mechanics, which are well understood. There is some stochastic uncertainty, but it is less than with financial systems and the error correction mechanisms are better formulated. Ships and aeroplanes are subject to uncertain winds and weather but, barring accidents, they normally reach their destinations. We even manage it with cars, though traffic delays may mean that it turns out, in retrospect, that we have chosen a sub-optimal route.
Financial institutions are harder because there is so much stochastic uncertainty and the laws, if one can call them that, that guide them are not understood all, as we can see from the discussion this evening. Further, the overall structure of all but the simplest financial institution is very complex, and this has defeated previous attempts to tackle the problem comprehensively.
The authors this evening have shown us a serious and complex system for tackling this problem, or at least part of it. A real life office can influence its sales of new business; it can adjust its bonus rates in response to changes in the financial environment and in order to keep it on a good track. A real defined benefit pension fund may be subject to surprises from changes in legislation or accounting requirements and may have to deal with bulk transfers in or out. But there is often some flexibility and discretion in awarding pension increases or improving benefits and in contribution rates. If all else fails, one can close the scheme to new entrants or even to future accrual, as some schemes recently have done. It would be too difficult to add these real world complexities to what is already a very complex problem.
The methodology of the authors derives from two sources, which we have heard something about already. The first was dynamic programing, which Dr Cairns described briefly, to optimise over time. The other approach starts with linear programing. Like dynamic programing, it is a common part of any course in Operational Research. A great many OR techniques are rather like actuarial techniques applied in different fields, and much OR methodology can be useful for actuaries.
Linear programing maximises a linear function in an n dimensional space, probably subject to linear constraints. It is deterministic; it is not a trivial problem if the dimensions are high. Quadratic programing, what is needed to solve the Markowitz portfolio selection problem, maximises a quadratic function subject to linear constraints, and so on. Stochastic programing then moves up a step. Instead of a deterministic objective function of fixed constraints, we may have uncertainty in any or all aspects of them. Then dynamic stochastic programing, which is what the authors are doing, combines the two strands. One is optimising over multiple time steps using a Bellman principle with each step as stochastic and that produces an enormously large linear programing problem, that the authors have developed methods to solve.
Most of their methods are described in other papers referred to in their paper, but some of the methods may be proprietary and therefore not fully described in the published material and that is a pity.
As Dr Cairns said, to solve the problem one would really like a tree simulation with 1,000 steps on each branch or 100 steps on each branch so that there would be 100 choices in period 1, followed by 100 more in period 2, making 10,000, followed by 100 more in period 3, making 1 million. It is possible to specify such a problem, but it is just as impractical as to specify every possible game for chess, which can nevertheless be shown by logical argument to be a wholly deterministic game if only one had big enough computers.
In solving this problem, there are some things that the authors have mentioned at the very beginning. They talk about guarantees but do not mention, although mentioned in the discussion, option pricing methodology, and the comparable dynamic hedging that goes with that. The option pricing method determines a possible investment strategy with dynamic hedging investment, which requires pretty frequent portfolio revisions, and I wonder whether some splicing in of dynamic hedging in respect of the downside guarantees might be possible.
The econometric model in Section 3 gets a lot of emphasis in the paper. It deserves a separate paper, because the heart of the paper in Section 5 could be tackled with any particular model, not necessarily the one that the authors have presented. This model is very difficult to assess without knowing the parameters, and without seeing specimen outputs. There is a problem in putting in too many influences. It is not quite a vector autoregressive model, certainly not a linear one, but there are so many possible parameters, that you cannot necessarily see what the important effects are.
There has been discussion about the difference between econometric and arbitragefree models. I think "arbitrage-free" is the wrong word. The Wilkie model, or any other of these types of models, is arbitrage-free in that there are no guaranteed profits to be made from particular strategies within the model, whereas they may be not market consistent in the sense that they may at times suggest that some particular investment has a very low rate of return as compared with others. I am a little surprised that Mr Smith is continuing to support, as he would call it, the arbitrage-free market efficient models as representing the real world. The Wilkie model, or those that might have followed it, would not have lost money in the last three years, whereas those who believe in the random walk model and therefore thought shares always did the same thing every year, at least had the same possibilities every year, might well have lost much. I can also possibly say that the Wilkie model had not made any money in the previous three years! It thought that share prices were too high in 1997 and it is still thinks they are a bit high in some countries.
Utility functions have come in for a bit of discussion. I am happy to follow Professor Dempster's approach, that utility functions are there to allow decision-makers to choose between different probability distributions. I do not think that it matters, as Mr Smith was bringing up in his last point, that the decision-makers do not have total information about the potential beneficiaries of the scheme. They have to make some sort of assumptions, the best assumptions that they can, about what the right level of security and the right level of pension increase is and what the right level of bonus would be for those beneficiaries, knowing that they are not dealing with the total wealth of the customers. On the other hand, they are the people who have to make decisions about alternative probability distributions and they need some strategy for taking them into account. The particular utility function that the authors have used, which adds up utilities over the years, I am not 100% happy with. I like the downside quadratic part. The sigma utility function over years does not take account of a possible trade-off between years. You may want a smooth consumption pattern over the years, but an individual may not mind too much whether he gets a bonus this year, when he can take a specially good holiday, or a bonus next year, when he can take that good holiday. You can trade off one against the other, and it is quite different to have the certainty of a bonus, but uncertainty about the timing of it as opposed to uncertainty about no bonuses, one bonus or two bonuses in successive years. So, taking into account correlation between years would be nice. This is the sort of paper that I hope some younger actuaries will take account of. I hope they will have time to study it and to learn about the really very complicated mathematical process that is at the heart of Section 5. Dealing with very large systems is necessary for solving problems. Dealing with very large numbers of simulations is necessary. The problem about doing huge numbers of simulations is that you get such enormous results all hidden inside the computer, and having some visualisation system for looking at the results you need can be very useful.
In my forthcoming paper I was producing one graph, which told me not an awful lot if I plotted it in one way, but I plot the same data in a slightly different way and see something rather striking coming out of it. It is just a matter of sometimes being fortunate in choosing the right way to look at something visually. It can give you lessons, which simply the numerical statistics do not do. The emphasis on visualisation presentation is important.
I hope many people in future study this paper and the other papers referred to in it, learn from it and take up this exciting subject, which I first discovered something about about 10 years ago when I first met Professor Dempster. Professor M. A. H. Dempster (in reply): I will tackle the President's questions, some of the other questions that have been discussed, and some of the points that Professor Wilkie raised.
On the point of non-constant volatilities, we do have non-constant volatilities in our model. What we did was transform the model in such a way that it had constant volatilities in spite of the fact that we began with state-dependent volatilities. For the emerging markets returns in equities and bonds, these are strategic asset/liability problems, so we are dealing really with emerging market indices: we use Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedastic (GARCH [1,1]) models and the now usual sort of way of dealing with nonconstant volatilities. That was just a small comment in answer to the President's first question.
What the President next questioned concerning LTCM amounts to asking, does the use of these models help the manager to narrow the funnel of doubt? That is the whole point of the exercise. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. I believe that some pudding has been eaten, but there is more to come! So far as "Will this reduce the cost or demand for derivatives?", if the funnel of doubt goes down, the need for derivatives goes down as well. So the answer to that question is one hopes so to a certain extent.
The point was made earlier that these techniques can be used to price derivatives, particularly if you study risk management problems for derivatives. We, and other people, have in fact done that, so our technology has been applied for that kind of technique.
A point that Professor Wilkie, Mr Smith and Dr Cairns made was that they would really like to see great big trees. We can solve problems with great big trees. In the experiments, I mentioned earlier, about stability we have been solving some trees, 100x100x100 and perhaps by another 100. But that means that we will not be able to study a dynamic problem, which might be over 20 years. We are not going to be able to rebalance every year or assume that we can solve a problem the size of the universe or something. We are not going to be able to do that. However, that is what the experiment is about, the stability of both the portfolio and actually the extreme scenarios in which the guarantees are violated. What this is really about is to try to see how to get the same results as for the huge problems that run for hours with appropriately chosen scenarios. We have a few more tricks up our sleeves for this, which we have not talked about in this paper. But we are working very hard on that problem because it is the key limitation. Some of our points have been reinforced in this discussion. With others the jury is out, but we have been arguing back and forth about these questions for some time.
Mr M. Germano (in reply): In reply to Professor Blake, we have been looking into ways to simulate wage inflation and trying to find the instruments that will allow us to add that risk, as well as mortality risk. It is under development.
Regarding Mr Smith's query, the point of view of the guarantor rather than the single individual, we are keeping that separate. The guarantor behind the product has his own model to add to the risk. We are looking to achieve a minimum wealth for the class of individual, not to add the risk for the corporation in terms of not meeting the target. There are two separate models. One is an underlying model system in a bank and that is different from the function that is in the model for the class of the individuals. Professor M. A. H. Dempster, Hon.F.I.A.: To take up the comment of Professor Blake, it is really about a simpler world in which people work in corporations, firms or professions. They finished training, started work and then retired. As Mr Germano mentioned earlier on, in the modern world that is not necessarily the case. People change professions. They are laid off. They change countries, and so on. So there are a lot more liabilities in an individual's life cycle. One of the points of this kind of modelling, is that it can be applied to this. In the first instance, it will only be a practical and economic solution if it applies to people who have a great deal of money and are facing some strange liability, shall we say. But, ultimately, we are going to be able to walk into a financial institution and have something tailored for each individual, using this kind of technology. However that may be many years away.
The President (Mr J. Goford, F.I.A.): The great joy of this paper was Mr Germano's introduction, where he demonstrated some serious customer needs focus which is very close to my heart, recognising that employees do have different needs, saving for pensions, for legacy, and those not so risk-averse.
I express my sincere thanks and the thanks of all of us to the authors, the opener and the closer and those who participated in the discussion.
-------WRITTEN CONTRIBUTION Mrs N. T. Ralston: It concerns me that we could be moving yet further into a world in which the senior managements, and boards, of insurance companies may well struggle to comprehend fully the basis on which their risks are taken. The same could apply to investment banks or others which use the sort of techniques outlined in the paper. This is a particularly insidious risk, as it is hard for boards to admit.
